[ Free OSINT Tool ]

Überprüfung Russischer Unternehmen

Geben Sie INN, OGRN oder den Firmennamen ein. Data is fetched from FNS EGRUL and financial reports.

Beispiele: 7707083893 · 1027700132195 · Газпром
Querying EGRUL...
Keine Unternehmen gefunden. Try a different INN, OGRN, or company name.

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Russland Due Diligence FAQ

Wie überprüfe ich den wahren Eigentümer (UBO)?

Prüfening a Russian company's UBO starts by querying the Federal Tax Service (FNS) EGRUL registry via INN. However, Russian business structures frequently utilize nominee shareholders and Cypriot shell entities. Deep UBO discovery requires cross-referencing historical SPARK-Interfax changes, analyzing court records (Arbitrazh), and performing advanced OSINT on the directors' social graphs to expose the real beneficiaries hidden from basic compliance screens.

Was sind INN und OGRN?

INN (ИНН) is the Taxpayer Identification Number, functioning as a unique identifier for individuals (12 digits) or legal entities (10 digits). OGRN (ОГРН) is the Primary State Registration Number (13 digits). When conducting OSINT investigations in the CIS, acquiring the correct INN is the foundational step for any corporate tracing operation.

Können westliche Compliance-Tools russische Sanktionsumgehung erkennen?

Increasingly, no. Following global sanctions, Russia passed laws allowing strategic enterprises to redact their ownership data from public view. Automated Western platforms (like Sayari or LexisNexis) scrape public APIs, which now return empty or fabricated nominee data. Detecting sanctions evasion (e.g., the 'Shadow Fleet' operations via Sovcomflot) requires specialized human intelligence, leaked database correlations, and maritime or customs traffic analysis (FTS logs).